Abstract: This paper establishes the existence of equilibria for environments in which outside money is issued competitively. Such equilibria are typically believed not to exist because of a classic overissue problem: if money is valued in equilibrium, an issuer produces money until its value is driven to zero. By backward induction, money cannot have value in the first place. This paper shows that overissuance is not a problem if agents believe that if an issuer produces more than some threshold number of notes, then only those notes issued up to the threshold will be valued; additional notes will be worthless. This result is very general, applying to any monetary economy in which equilibria with and without valued money exist if the money supply is finite. The paper also compares the allocation achieved by a monopolist to that achieved with competitive issuance in both a search and an overlapping-generations environment. The results depend on the environment considered, but two general conclusions arise. First, it is ambiguous whether competitive issuers can achieve a more desirable allocation than a monopolist. Second, with competitive issuance, a licensing agency can always improve on pure laissez-faire and achieve the efficient allocation in the long run.
Introduction
There is a long literature advocating the competitive issuance of fiat money-money that is intrinsically worthless and inconvertible, and thus an outside money, one that is not a liability of the issuer. Hayek is perhaps the most prominent contributor to this literature, largely thanks to his 1976 book Denationalisation of Money. There Hayek describes how an equilibrium with competitive issuance of outside money could come about and argues that such an equilibrium would likely dominate the equilibrium arising when the government monopolizes currency issuance. It establishes the existence of an equilibrium with private issuance of outside money and compares the allocations obtained by monopoly and competitive issuers. There appears to be no general proof of the existence of equilibria when outside money is privately issued. Indeed, it is more commonly argued that such equilibria cannot exist. Hellwig (1985) argues this more generally, while Calvo (1978) and White (1999) , among others, appeal to a time-consistency problem that affects any unregulated issuers. Proofs of nonexistence have been provided by Ritter (1995) in a search model and by Taub (1985) and Bryant (1981) in an overlappinggenerations (OG) model.
Arguments justifying the nonexistence of equilibria with private issuance of outside currency typically go as follows. If issuing new money is costless and money has some positive value, then an agent with the right to issue money will do so in infinite quantity, thus inflating away the money's value. Hence, in the limit, with an infinite stock of money issued, money has no value, and by backward induction, no equilibrium exists with valued outside money. Time inconsistency is a key feature of this argument because issuers always want to believe they will constrain their note issuance, but when they need to they never have the incentive to do so. This paper differs from most of the existing literature in focusing on the possibility that privately issued outside money may be worthless in equilibrium even when issued in finite quantities. Equilibria with valued, privately issued outside money are shown to exist if agents believe that all notes issued up to some threshold level will be valued, but additional notes will be worthless. These beliefs create a discontinuity in the value of the marginal unit of money.
This discontinuity, in turn, undoes the logic of the standard nonexistence result. Because the value of a marginal unit of money reaches zero for some finite money supply, the limit argument no longer applies.
The logic behind this existence result is very general and applies to any monetary model in which money is worthless if all agents believe it has no value. To emphasize this point, this paper formally establishes existence in environments similar to the environments in which nonexistence has previously been established. It does so first in a search environment similar to that of Ritter (1995) , and second in an OG environment that resembles that in Taub (1985) . In each environment, the allocations under competitive and monopoly issuance are compared. The monopolist is modeled in the search environment as a coalition of otherwise unremarkable agents. This modeling approach is typical in matching models of money (e.g., Li, (1995 ), Ritter (1995 , Aiyagari and Wallace (1997) , and Li and Wright (1998) ). To facilitate comparison of the two environments, the monopolist is modeled in the same way in the OG model.
The results obtained depend on the environment considered. In the search environment, competitive issuers achieve the efficient quantity of money in the long run only for specific parameterizations that have measure zero in the parameter space. A monopolist does not achieve the efficient money supply either. In the OG environment, the efficient allocation is achieved in finitely many periods if agents incur a cost of becoming money issuers. A monopoly issuer might achieve as desirable an allocation, but only if its actions are sufficiently constrained by agents' beliefs.
In taking this approach, this paper foregoes characterizing all possible equilibria for either the OG or search environments presented. There are certainly many assumptions about beliefs, and the communication needed to support those beliefs, that could be considered, and many types of equilibria could arise. Some would have privately issued money in circulation; some would not. Studying a wider range of those equilibria would be an interesting exercise in its own right, although beyond the scope of this paper. Here, the goal is simply to show that there are some assumptions on beliefs and communication that give rise to the equilibrium with competitively supplied fiat money that Hayek and others have envisioned.
Two general conclusions emerge from the analysis. First, it is ambiguous whether competitive issue should be preferred to monopoly issue. Second, when money is issued competitively, a licensing agency that sets the cost incurred by agents who choose to become money issuers can always achieve the efficient allocation in the long run. The paper thus partially vindicates Hayek. On the one hand, it is shown that equilibria with competitive issue of fiat money can exist, as Hayek argued. On the other hand, it is not clear that such equilibria have desirable welfare properties. Finally, a pure laissez-faire approach is always weakly dominated by the introduction of a regulating institution.
In showing that competitive issuance of money is feasible, this paper contributes to the literature that Hayek's writing stimulated. Klein (1974) provides an early technical argument based on reputation formation for the existence of equilibria with competitive issuance, while more recently Monnet and Berentsen have provided more formal analyses that are closer in spirit to this paper.
2 Monnet (2002) uses a deterministic-matching model to compare the allocation achieved when money is issued by private agents to the allocation when money is issued by a public agent (an agent producing a public good). Although an equilibrium with valued fiat money issued by private agents exists in his model, the argument is less general since he obtains existence by assuming that agents know the exact sequence of meetings. In his framework, public money is optimal. In a random-matching model like those here, Berensten (2000) shows that there exists a time-consistent policy that allows a monopolist to supply money. Since
Berentsen does not consider competitive issuance of money, he cannot do the welfare comparisons done here. Moreover, he does not consider private issuance in overlappinggenerations environments, so he cannot compare across types of models, as done here.
In considering the competitive issuance of outside money, this paper is parallel to a growing and relatively recent literature considering the competitive private issuance of inside money, money that is a liability of the issuer, that the issuer promises to redeem. Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999a and b) , Cavalcanti, Erosa, Temzelides (1999) , and Williamson (1999) exemplify this line of research. 3 The literature on competitive outside money issuance is closely related to the work on competitive inside money issuance in that in some sense the real novelty in both cases is that they find equilibria with competitive issuance. In so doing, these papers expand economists' understanding of what competitive issuance might look like and how the economy would perform under it. They thus stand in sharp contrast to standard models of money with government-issued currency.
These literatures diverge, however, in that there has not been much question about the possibility of existence of privately issued inside money. Since inside money is by definition an obligation of the issuer, the promise to redeem, if credible, is enough for inside money to be valued. And in fact, valued private inside money has been around since the creation of deposits.
Equilibria with outside money-money that is not an obligation of any agent in the economyhave proven more difficult to achieve theoretically and have rarely been witnessed in practice.
Another point of divergence concerns the endogeneity of the number of issuers. Here, 3 Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999b) actually considers the case where both inside and outside money coexist. The outside money is an exogenously given stock of currency that is not a liability of any agent in the economy. The inside money is issued by private agents known as banks and is a liability of all issuers since banks in their paper are required to accept any privately issued money presented to them.
under competition, there is free entry into money issuing, subject to a one-time cost in terms of disutility. Each agent chooses whether to issue money or not, and the fraction of agents issuing is determined in equilibrium. This contrasts with the existing literature, such as Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999a and b) , which takes the fraction that issue, even under competition, as exogenous.
This paper is also related to a third literature, the literature endogenizing the supply of money in search models. Contributions to that literature include Araujo and Camargo (2001) , Burdett, Trejos, and Wright (2001) , and Peterson (2001) , as well as the paper by Camera, Craig, and Waller (2003) , which focuses on competition among existing currencies.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the search environment and compares the allocations achieved by a monopolist to those achieved by competitive issuers.
Section 3 undertakes the same exercise in an OG environment, and section 4 concludes.
A Search-Theoretic Environment
The first environment considered is a search model of money of the type developed by Wright (1991, 1993) . The case with competitive money issuance is studied first, followed by the case of monopoly issuance. Welfare is then compared across each case. The private issue of outside money has already been studied in such models by Ritter (1995) . Ritter finds that outside money can be valued in equilibrium if supplied by a monopolistic coalition of agents, but not if supplied competitively. This section considers a search environment similar to Ritter's. With competitive issuance and the beliefs assumed in this paper, an equilibrium with privately issued money exists whenever agents can make common knowledge the total number of notes they have issued. With a monopolistic issuer, an equilibrium with valued privately issued fiat money is also possible, though beliefs might not constrain a monopolistic issuer the way they do competitive issuers. As a result, equilibria with monopolistic issuance do not necessarily dominate equilibria with competitive issuance.
The Physical Environment
The economy is populated by a mass 1 of agents who live forever. Time is discrete and denoted by . At every date, agents meet in randomly matched pairs. There are types of agents and types of consumption goods in each period. Consumption goods are indivisible and cannot be stored.
Preferences are such that agents of type get utility u from consuming good i and no utility from consuming any other goods. These agents can also produce good , modulo at a cost in utility, where . This guarantees that no meeting results in a double coincidence of wants and that no barter will take place.
A technology exists for producing storable, nondepreciating, and nonfalsifiable objects called money that do not directly yield utility. Monies thus can be thought of as pieces of paper currency. It is assumed that the technology allows agents to differentiate their money from the money produced by others, and that agents can at all times make public knowledge the total amount of money issued to date. Both assumptions are fairly standard; models of multiple currencies typically assume that the currencies can be differentiated and that the stock of each money is known by all agents (see, for example, Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993) , and Shi (1995) ). One difference between those models and the one in this paper is that in this paper the money supply is not given, but determined endogenously. Hence, it should be noted that, in principle, any issuer of an outside money has an incentive to convince the public that its notes will have, and maintain, their value. 6 Further, historical evidence from the Free Banking Era in 5 Ritter (1995) considers an environment in which barter is possible and 0 c = . In this paper barter is ruled out for simplicity. If , money is not essential because gift giving is always an equilibrium (indeed, that equilibrium Pareto dominates the monetary equilibrium). Hence the focus here is on environments with . 0 c = 0 c > 6 As Klein (1974) simplicity, attention is restricted to pure strategies. Specifically, money is exchanged for goods with either probability 0 or probability 1.
Monies are subject to a storage constraint: an agent can carry at most one unit of money. 7 The authors are indebted to Warren Weber for providing this information. 8 δ can be thought of as an entry fee or, alternatively, as the cost incurred by issuers to make public knowledge the number of notes they have issued, say by hiring an outside auditor to guarantee their note count, and advertising the findings. 9 Other types of beliefs can be supported as an equilibrium as well (see, for example, Wright 1994) . These beliefs are meant to capture Hayek's (1990, p. 51) view that "[An issuer] would know that the penalty for failing to fulfill the expectations raised would be the prompt loss of the business." Allowing agents to observe the signal at additional dates could have been assumed as well. However, that significantly complicates the analysis.
With this storage constraint, along with the indivisibility of money and goods, the exchange rate between any two valued monies must be one. Allowing for divisible goods as in Trejos and Wright (1995) would complicate the exposition without modifying the results of the paper in a meaningful way. Additional equilibria could exist, with different currencies trading at different prices, as in Aiyagari, Wallace, and Wright (1996) . Even if all currencies had to trade at the same price, there could be equilibria with different price levels, as in Shi (1995) . Here, however, the concern is only with whether currency is issued and accepted, and the results on those dimensions should remain unchanged.
The following definition may now be stated:
Definition: An equilibrium at each t is a sequence of money supplies { } 
Competitively Supplied Money
As mentioned above, agents issue outside money; that is, notes are not a liability of the issuer. Further, as is shown in Appendix A, Claim 1, in equilibrium an issuer might not accept a note issued by another agent. More importantly, an issuer might not even accept its own notes, yet they are still valued in equilibrium.
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There is free entry into money issuing. A , with mass μ , denotes the set of agents α who can issue money. Given μ and the beliefs of agents about the value of money, the path of the money stock can be determined.
Agents play a two-stage game. In the first stage, they choose whether to become money 10 This is in contrast to Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999 a and b) , for example. These authors study inside money and assume issuers who do not accept a note, regardless or who issued it, are punished with autarky. Without this punishment, the authors would not have equilibria with valued privately issued notes. Thus, the fact that the notes in their models are a liability of the issuer-are inside money, not outside money-is critical for their results.
issuers. In the second stage, they are randomly matched and can trade with each other. The game can be solved by backward induction. First, the trading stage can be solved for a given value of μ . The solution reflects the value of being a money issuer and relies on agents' Lbeliefs. Proposition 1, which implies that the money supply in this economy cannot exceed L μ , can now be stated.
Proposition 1:
A money issuer will issue at most L notes.
Proof:
Consider an agent who can exchange goods for the L +1 note of a money issuer. This agent believes the note will be worthless if he accepts it because no other agent will exchange goods for the note. Hence, he will never give up goods for the note. ■ Given the value of issuing money from the trading stage, the first stage of the game can be solved. It will be shown that, for given parameters, only one value of μ is consistent with an equilibrium. If in equilibrium , then agents must be indifferent between issuing and not issuing money. Agents play a mixed strategy in the first stage of the game and choose to become money issuers with probability
μ . It is assumed that a law of large numbers holds such that the mass of agents that become money issuers is μ and issuers are identically distributed across the k types.
It remains to determine μ as a function of δ , the disutility from becoming an issuer.
Agents will become money issuers if the expected gain from doing so is at least as high as δ .
For simplicity, money issuers are assumed not to produce goods in exchange for a unit of money. 11 Given this assumption, if 0 δ = , then all agents become money issuers and there is no equilibrium in which money is valued because no agent will accept money in exchange. 12 If 0 δ > , then some agents will not become money issuers. As is shown below, for a given μ , 11 Appendix A shows that there exist parameter values for the model such that this is individually rational for money issuers. Alternatively, one could assume that the storage constraint prevents a money issuer from holding both the technology necessary for producing money and one unit of money. 12 The case Ritter (1995) considers is equivalent to the one here with 0
there exists a 0 δ > such that agents are indifferent between issuing and not issuing money. For δ sufficiently high, no agent issues money and autarky results.
The rest of this subsection characterizes equilibria. The general case with 1 L ≥ is considered first, and the simpler case with 1 L = , for which a closed-form solution is provided, is presented second.
Given the mass μ of potential money issuers, there is a mass ( ) t I j of issuers who can issue up to j units of money at date t. The money stock carried into date t, t M , then satisfies
That is, the money stock at the beginning of period t is equal to the maximum number of notes that can be issued, less the number of notes that have not been issued yet. This implies that the mass of agents who are either holding a note or able to issue a note in period t is given by
These are the agents who do not produce goods in exchange for money. It follows that is the probability of meeting an agent who is not holding a note and cannot issue one. Likewise, is the probability of meeting someone holding a note or able to issue one. With this notation, the law of motion for
< L, since all money issuers have the ability to issue L notes at t = 1. The sequences t M and t M can be constructed using (2.2).
Finally, to complete the characterization of equilibria with competitive issuance when 1 L ≥ requires determining the relationship between the mass of money issuers, μ, and the cost (disutility), δ . Intuitively, for each fixed cost of becoming a money issuer, there corresponds a fraction of the population that chooses to issue money. The greater the cost is, the smaller the fraction of the population that issues money. And the fewer people issuing money, the higher the value of being a money issuer and the lower the value of being a nonissuer. In equilibrium, the fraction of the population issuing money adjusts so that agents are indifferent between issuing and not issuing money. Of course, there are some values of δ so high that no one issues, and some so low that everyone issues and eventually there are no nonissuers to accept money in exchange. Thus, there exists an equilibrium with competitive money issuance for all δ within some interval.
The formal proof of existence requires the value function for each type of agent in the economy. denotes the value function of a money issuer who can issue j units of money when the entry cost is
and denote the value functions for a nonissuer who holds one unit of money and a nonissuer who does not hold a unit of money, respectively. These value functions depend on the probability of each type of agent meeting agents with whom he could
trade. An agent who does not hold money will produce goods upon meeting an agent of the correct type who either holds a unit of money or is a note issuer who has not yet issued L units of money. The probability of the union of these two events is . An agent who holds a unit of money is in a position similar to that of a money issuer. Both can consume if they meet an agent of the right type who is not holding a note and who cannot issue one. The probability of meeting such an agent is . Thus, the value functions take the following forms:
where is the discount factor. If money issuers never produce goods in exchange for money, as has been assumed, then . This is proven in Appendix A. And in equilibrium, it must be the case that
The following proposition may now be stated:
Proposition 2. With competitive issuance, there is one equilibrium for each value of money cannot be valued because in the limit all agents hold money and no more trading can occur. In that case, money is worthless and, by backward induction, can never have value. If the latter inequality is violated, then no money is ever issued, and thus money has no value.
It is easy to see that ( ) μ δ is a decreasing function of δ . Assume that ( ) ( )
A larger value of μ makes holding money less valuable, everything else being equal. Indeed, as μ increases, decreases and increases, for all t. This then implies that is increasing The more simple case with 1 L = , for which a closed-form solution can be obtained, is now considered. In this case, and 
Subtracting (2.6) from (2.7) yields V V δ − = , and solving for μ , taking into account the fact that ( )
Thus, for a given δ , a value of ( ) μ δ can be found from (2.11) that makes agents indifferent regarding money issuing. In other words, given δ , an equilibrium exists if agents choose to become money issuers with probability ( ) μ δ . 
Monopolistically Supplied Money
As mentioned previously, Ritter (1995) shows that an equilibrium with valued fiat money exists when the money is supplied by a coalition of agents acting as a monopolist. This subsection models monopoly issuance in the spirit of Ritter and considers the impact of agents' beliefs on the equilibrium. It turns out that the monopolist might not be constrained by agents' beliefs.
Agents are selected randomly from the population of all agents to be offered admission to 13 Alternatively, one could assume that agents face different costs i R 15 A is the set of agents α of mass μ who choose to join the coalition.
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As in the competitive case, agents have L-beliefs regarding the value of money. They believe that only the first L notes issued by the monopolist will have value. Whether such beliefs can be supported as an equilibrium, and thus whether these beliefs constrain the monopolist, depends on the extent to which members of the coalition can act collectively and on the value of c. It is assumed that members of the coalition can be identified as such although their individual identities remain anonymous. It is further assumed that their note issuance can be monitored.
These assumptions allow them to act collectively to supply money, abiding by any limit the coalition sets on the fraction of agents issuing money at a particular date. It also means that they can agree to produce for each other when they meet in single-coincidence meetings. This means that the coalition might not be limited to issuing L notes if c is sufficiently small. The ability to commit is sufficient to make additional notes (beyond L) valuable for noncoalition members, even if they believe that no other noncoalition members will accept the extra notes.
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In what follows, the money supply that maximizes the monopoly's utility is taken to be M . Given the assumptions on the coalition, gift giving will prevail in trades among coalition 14 This assumes for simplicity, as in Ritter, that only one coalition forms.
15 If δ is too high, only a fraction of those offered admission would join the coalition. In this case, μ would represent the fraction of selected agents that actually join the coalition. 16 The size of the coalition, μ , is taken as given here. Other papers in the literature on private money, whether inside or outside money, also typically take the size of the coalition or banking system as given. 17 This differs from Ritter somewhat, however, because Ritter assumes that producing goods is costless, whereas here there is a cost of producing. Thus, in this paper, to guarantee coalition members will accept each other's notes, it must be assumed that the coalition can monitor its members. Indeed, ex post a coalition member would prefer not to produce for another coalition member because of the cost of doing so. Of course, coalition members will only commit to accept each other's notes if it allows them to achieve greater welfare ex ante. It will be shown that this is the case for some parameter values. Hence, even though in equilibrium the coalition's notes may look like inside money because coalition members agree to redeem them, it is not assumed that they redeem the notes. Rather, it is shown that it is welfare-maximizing for the coalition members to agree to do so ex ante. Again, this is in contrast to Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999 a and b) , and Cavalcanti, Erosa, and Temzelides (1999) The coalition chooses the steady-state money stock M and the path of the money supply to maximize the expected utility of its representative member. Since the representative coalition member is better off consuming sooner rather than later, the coalition naturally chooses to issue money as quickly as possible until the money supply reaches the desired maximum level. Thus, the coalition's choice of t γ , the fraction of coalition agents who can issue currency at date t,
for some finite date at which the steady state is reached. This implies that the money supply evolves according to
This says that the money supply at t + 1 is the money supply at t plus the money introduced by coalition agents who can issue money and want to do so (that is, those who can replenish their money holdings after trading with a noncoalition member who does not have money but can produce the desired consumption good).
It remains to determine M . As in Ritter (1996) , the thought experiment is as follows.
At the optimal level M , the marginal utility of increasing the money supply by a small amount should be zero. Assume that the economy is at a steady state at some date T. An increase in the money supply increases the expected utility of coalition members since they might be able to issue an additional note and consume. The cost comes from a reduction of expected utility in the steady state due to the increase in the money supply. Formally, the welfare of a member of the coalition is evaluated, taking into account the small increase in the money supply. Then, the derivative of this expression with respect to the new level of the money supply, evaluated at the steady state, with
=M , should be equal to zero, and yield M .
First, the expected utility of a coalition member at date T is
where T M denotes the fraction of coalition members who hold a unit of money (which, in the steady state, is equal to the fraction of all agents holding a unit of money). and denote the expected utility of coalition members from holding one note and zero notes, respectively.
It is assumed that the money supply will be increased by a very small amount ε, so that
Note that, if money is only issued in meetings between a coalition member and a noncoalition member, the economy will not be in a steady state at date T+1. Indeed, the fraction of noncoalition members holding money will be greater than the fraction of coalition members holding money. To keep things tractable, it is assumed that ( ) 1 μ ε − notes are issued to noncoalition agents and με are issued to coalition members. Coalition agents are better off accepting the gift of με notes from other coalition members than insisting on gift-giving.
Consequently, the economy is in a steady state at date T+1. Specifically, it is assumed that the coalition members who are allowed to issue notes to purchase goods from noncoalition members are randomly chosen, and that the με notes issued to coalition members are randomly attributed to coalition members who have produced for other coalition members.
These assumptions yield only an approximation of the steady-state money supply chosen by the coalition. The approximation will underestimate the true value of M because this approach underestimates the benefits to the coalition of increasing the money supply by ε.
Indeed, what the coalition would prefer to do is to distribute the με notes over time to coalition members who do not hold money and are in meetings with noncoalition members who produce the right kind of good. The money would be injected so as to maintain the fraction of noncoalition member holding money equal to M . In other words, the coalition could improve the distribution of the με notes by giving them to agents who can consume right away rather than by giving them to random agents. Note that if coalition agents are patient (β is close to 1), then the steady-state money supply provided by this approximation is very close to the optimal steady-state money supply. Indeed, if 1 β = , the derivation gives the optimal steady-state money supply. The reason is that, when coalition agents are very patient, the fact that their consumption is delayed, in the approximation, compared to what it would be under the optimal policy, does not affect welfare very much.
Proceeding with the derivation, M satisfies
where is from T W (2.13). Appendix B shows that the solution to this expression is ( ) ( )
The solution for M implies that the monopolist overissues money if 1 β < and 1 μ < , issuing more than the socially efficient money supply of 1/2. The reason is that with the price of money fixed, coalition members can increase their consumption-and social welfare-by issuing more notes up to the point where the money supply is 1/2. Beyond that point, they can further increase their consumption to some degree before the reduction in social welfare offsets such gains. However, the monopolist never issues so much that there cannot be a monetary equilibrium.
Additionally, the solution in (2.14) holds only for 1 μ < . At 1 μ = , with all agents in the coalition, there is a nonmonetary equilibrium with gift giving among all agents.
Since agents outside the coalition can solve for M just as easily as agents within the coalition, all agents should expect that the coalition would want to issue M notes. And agents should know that at most M notes will be accepted in exchange. Hence in this case, it is easier to understand where L might come from. Most likely, L will exactly equal M .
The following proposition may now be stated and proved.
Proposition 3: Suppose all agents have beliefs with threshold L. If c, the cost of production, is sufficiently small, beliefs such that L M < cannot be supported as an equilibrium and thus do not constrain the monopolist.
Proof: Assume date t is the first date at which the money supply exceeds L, and consider the problem of a noncoalition agent who must decide whether to accept a note issued by a member of the coalition. Assume further that the agent believes that no other noncoalition agents will accept this note in period t+1 or later. Since new notes are issued only to noncoalition agents, and noncoalition agent may not accept notes before date t, the fraction of coalition members holding money, denoted by t M , is smaller than the fraction of noncoalition agent holding money. The probability at t+1 of the aforementioned agent meeting a coalition member who does not hold a note and sells the good the agent desires is ( )
M is the actual money stock at date t. Since coalition members commit to accept notes that were issued above the threshold, then the expected utility for the noncoalition agent of accepting a note at t is no less than . Hence, if
, the agent is better off accepting a unit of money at t even if t M L > . By symmetry, all agents accept the monopolist's money and the hypothesized beliefs cannot be supported as an equilibrium. ■ Clearly, since coalition members can issue their own notes, they do not need to incur the cost of producing for another agent in order to get a note. For any 0 μ > , there exists a c small enough that money will be accepted even if the coalition issues more than the threshold L. And coalition members have an incentive to commit to accept each others' notes since such a commitment allows them to achieve a money supply greater than L. If M L > , and L is sufficiently small, then members of the coalition achieve higher expected welfare if they commit to accept each other's notes (and thus achieve a long-run money supply of M ) than if they do not (and achieve a long-run money supply of L). When coalition members commit to accept each other's notes, their notes are essentially inside money. However, this is a result of the model, not an assumption.
Welfare Properties of Equilibria
It remains to evaluate welfare under competitive and monopoly issuance. Following standard practice in these models, welfare is taken to be the weighted sum of agents' utilities.
Two questions can be asked. First, can either a monopolistic coalition or competitive issuers necessarily achieve the optimal quantity of money in the long run? Second, in general, does monopolistic issuance yield higher welfare than competitive issuance? As will be shown, the answer to the first question is simple: No. The answer to the second question depends on the parameters of the model.
In a model identical to this one but with a constant and exogenous money supply, it is
well known that the optimal money stock is 1/2. The long-run quantity of money obtained with monopolistic issuance and with competitive issuance will be compared to this value.
Proposition 2 showed that for a given L, there exists an equilibrium with competitively issued money for each pair ( ) ( ) , δ μ δ . In any such equilibrium, the long-run money supply is given by ( ) Lμ δ . Clearly there is only one value of δ such that
The farther δ is from that value, the farther the long-run money supply is from 1/2. Thus, in general, with competitive issuance, the long-run money supply is not optimal.
In contrast, with a monopolist issuer who is not constrained by agents' beliefs, the money supply as already noted is M . From (2.14), it is clear that M is independent of δ and k. As the size of the coalition increases ( ), the money supply chosen by the coalition converges to the optimal money supply. Likewise, as 1 μ ↑ 1 β ↑ , M approaches 1/2 from above. Intuitively, the monopoly balances the immediate gain from seigniorage against the future cost to its members of having to live in an economy with too much money. The more patient agents are, the greater this cost is relative to the gains from seigniorage.
Whether expected welfare is higher with a monopolistic coalition or with competitive issuers depends on the parameters of the model. Suppose, for example, that beliefs would constrain the money supply to be arbitrarily small. Then if c is small enough and β high enough, the monopoly coalition can achieve higher welfare since it is not constrained by the threshold. Moreover, for a given long-run quantity of money, the transition to the steady state involves a smaller welfare cost with a monopolist than with competitive issuance. Indeed, the monopolist reaches the steady state as quickly as is feasible, while with competitive issuance, the quantity of money tends to the steady state as t tends to infinity. However, it could be the case that beliefs would set the competitive money supply equal to or very close to 1/2, the optimal money supply. If β is close to 1, agents are very patient and the cost of the transition has very little weight. Then, from (2.14), it can be seen that there exists a μ so small that M is close to one. If μ is decreased in this manner, then by increasing β , making agents very patient, it is possible to make the cost of having M close to one so high that welfare is higher with competitive issuance than with the monopoly.
Two other points deserve to be noted. First, it should be clear that even if the long-run money supply were equal to 1/2, the transition to the steady state would involve a welfare loss compared to the case where the money supply is given exogenously at the initial date and 1/2.
Second, the fact that each money issuer incurs disutility of δ also results in a welfare loss.
Instead of taking δ as given, it could be assumed that there exists some institution in charge of licensing money issuers. This institution could choose the disutility δ from obtaining a license. 18 With competition, such a licensing institution is always able to achieve the optimal long-run quantity of money. It simply has to choose δ so that
In contrast, with monopoly issuance a licensing institution is ineffective since the long-run money supply is independent of δ .
These results can be summarized in the following proposition. In summary, these results partially vindicate Hayek. On the one hand, equilibria exist when money is issued competitively, as Hayek argued. However, there is no guarantee that these equilibria have desirable welfare properties. Such equilibria will achieve the optimal quantity of money only for a particular value of δ . One way to ensure that the optimal δ obtains is to assume that some institution, perhaps some government regulatory agency, charges an appropriate licensing, or entry, fee. The operation of such an institution is inconsistent with
Hayek's advocacy of laissez-faire money issuance. Taub (1985) has shown in an OG model the nonexistence of an equilibrium with competitive issuance of outside money. This section shows, in a similar OG model, that such an equilibrium can exist when agents have L-beliefs. This is because these beliefs eliminate the time inconsistency problem at the root of the nonexistence result in Taub's paper. The approach closely parallels the search-theoretic model of Section 2 to facilitate comparison and to emphasize that the existence result is not an artifact of the search environment.
An Overlapping-Generations Environment

The Physical Environment
The economy exists at dates t = 1, 2, …. At each date, a new generation of mass 1 of two-period-lived agents is born into the economy. At date 1 t = , the economy also consists of a mass 1 of old agents. Agents must pay a resource cost of 0 δ ≥ to become money issuers and make their stock of money public knowledge.
Competitively Supplied Money
The monies are issued at date t by a set of agents with typical member for all t such that all agents believe that the first L α units of money α will be accepted in exchange for goods but that no additional units of money α will be valued. 21 For simplicity, for all α is assumed. Clearly, with such beliefs money issuers will not be able to issue
This assumption of divisible monies contrasts with the assumption of indivisible monies in the search model. Divisibility is important here because it allows each agent who becomes a money issuer to have an equal share of the money supply and thus for there to be a representative issuer. 20 If α θ takes values in a bounded set, the model's steady state would not be qualitatively different if a different signal were observed at each date. It would just take longer to reach the steady state. 21 One could assume, alternatively, that the threshold is a percentage of the money supply outstanding rather than a level. This would not modify the results regarding the existence of an equilibrium with valued fiat money. It would, however, modify the results regarding welfare. When the threshold is a percentage, the equilibrium allocation never achieves, or even converges to, the efficient allocation. more than L notes (see proposition 1).
In this economy, the exchange rate is indeterminate as in Kareken and Wallace (1981) .
Assuming that all notes have the same face value and are exchanged one-for-one simplifies the exposition without altering the qualitative results. Thus, each note issued is assumed to have a face value of $1.
The initial old generation will consume nothing unless they pay δ and issue money themselves. Since they prefer to consume, and the utility function is strictly increasing, they will issue L units of money, the most that will be valued in trade. The money supply at date 1 is thus
Agents can hold as many units of money as they choose each period. 
Clearly, if and only if
Further, since the fraction t μ of agents who become money issuers at date t satisfies It is important to notice that 
can only hold for a specific value of t μ .
The money supply at date t, t M , evolves according to
The price level adjusts to clear the money market:
The following lemma will prove useful. The long-run money supply can be shown to depend on δ . If δ is high enough, only the initial old generation issues money and t M L = for all t. As δ decreases, more generations issue money and the money stock grows. This is described formally in the following proposition.
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Proposition 5: For all δ > 0, there exist T δ < ∞ such that the following are true: If t T δ < , then
Proof: If δ is too high, it might be the case that no agents issue notes. In such a situation,
. For the remainder of the proof, it is assumed that δ is not too high. 
Finally, since
for all t T δ > , and no agents choose to issue notes. Since the money supply does not increase further, the economy reaches a steady state. ■
Monopolistically Supplied Money
To facilitate comparison to the search model, a monopoly issuer is taken to be a coalition of otherwise unremarkable agents. In each generation a set of agents of mass t μ is selected randomly and invited to join the coalition. For simplicity, it is assumed that t μ μ = for all t. To join, these agents must pay a utility cost δ . In equilibrium, a fraction t γ of selected agents chooses to join the coalition. 26 The coalition decides how much money to issue at each date and divides what it issues equally among its members. 27 Consequently, the agent's optimization problem with monopoly issuance is as specified in equations (3.1) through (3.3), but with (3.3)
The monopoly always issues as many notes as it can. This is due to the fact that, having finite lives, the coalition's members do not benefit from moderating their money issuance. Thus the monopoly here behaves differently than it does in the search environment, where the ability to act collectively allows it to moderate its money issuance.
L-beliefs can work in one of two ways in this environment. One possibility is that the limit L applies to the total notes issued by the coalition for all time. In this case, the members of the initial old generation will issue the entire money supply, so t M L = for all . For the members of all future generations, belonging to the coalition confers no benefits so no one joins.
t ≥
The other possibility is that the limit L applies to money issuance at each date. This in effect means that every generation faces a limit of L on the notes it can issue. As in the case of competitive issuance, each coalition member's share of the proceeds from money issuing is ( ) γ has a slightly different interpretation than it did in the search environment. In the latter case, the monopolistic coalition is chosen once and for all at the beginning of time, and t γ denotes the fraction of coalition members allowed to issue a unit of money at date t. In contrast, in the OG environment, a new coalition is formed at each date, and t γ is the fraction of those offered membership who actually join at date t. Agents would not pay δ to join unless they expected to issue money. money supply thus evolves according to 
As the money supply increases, so does the price level, reducing the benefits from becoming a money issuer. At some date T, only a fraction of the selected members will agree to become money issuers (i.e., 0 1 t γ < < ). Members of generation T will be indifferent between issuing and not issuing money. No member of any subsequent generation will become a money issuer (i.e., 0 t γ = ). This can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6: For each 0 δ > , there exists a T δ < ∞ such that the following are true: If t T δ < ,
Proof: The proof follows the same steps as the proof of Proposition 5 and is therefore omitted. ■
Welfare Properties of Equilibria
Following Green (1997) , welfare is evaluated relative to an efficient stationary allocation.
This criterion has the advantage of being technically simple, as well as implying the standard Pareto-efficiency criterion. Indeed, Okuno and Zilcha (1980) show that an efficient stationary allocation is Pareto efficient in the set of all feasible allocations of the infinite-horizon economy. With competitive issuance and 0 δ = , all members of each generation choose to become money issuers. However, as the money stock increases, the money issued by new generations represents an ever smaller fraction of the total. So while the price is steadily rising, it increases at a decreasing rate, the inflation rate converges to 1. Thus, the equilibrium allocation converges to the efficient allocation as t tends to infinity.
Alternatively, from Proposition 5, if If instead the threshold applies only to the members of the coalition in a given generation, then the money supply grows continuously according to
No money is issued by generations t > T, and the allocation is efficient for these generations. In generations t < T, issuers consume strictly more than nonissuers.
With monopoly issuance, the efficient allocation is not only reached, but is reached in the same number of periods as with competition. Indeed, the money supply grows at the same rate with the coalition as it does with competitors-it increases by L every period-and all agents pay the same cost for the opportunity to issue notes. Further, until the efficient allocation is achieved, competition yields greater welfare since the monopolistic coalition introduces randomness in the consumption of ex ante identical agents. These results can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 7: Both a monopolistic coalition and competitive issuers achieve the efficient allocation after finitely many periods. . This also implies that, as was the case in the search environment, a licensing agency is able to achieve efficiency by setting δ. Here, however, it can do so under both monopolistic and competitive issuance. Of course, if the monopoly is the government, it might not choose to license or otherwise constrain itself.
Conclusion
This paper established the existence of an equilibrium with competitively issued outside money in both a search and an OG framework. These environments were chosen for two reasons. First, the search and OG models are arguably the most frequently used models in monetary economics. Second, for each of these frameworks it has previously been proven that a monetary equilibrium with competitive issuance cannot exist.
The existence result obtained here is expected to hold in other environments as well.
Indeed, it only depends on the existence of an equilibrium where money is valued because agents believe that it will be, as well as an equilibrium where money is not valued because agents believe it will not be. This appears to apply to any model in which an equilibrium with valued fiat money can obtain.
The welfare results, however, are specific to the environment considered. Two conclusions can be drawn that apply to each environment studied. First, it is ambiguous whether welfare is higher with competitive issuance than with monopoly issuance. Second, a licensing agency can achieve the efficient allocation if money is issued competitively, at least in the long run.
If money is issued competitively in the search environment, the efficient quantity of money is in general not achieved. In the search environment, there is only one money stock consistent with optimality, and there is no guarantee that the money stock that can come about given agents' beliefs will be the optimal one. Only for a specific cost of becoming a money issuer (δ in the model) is the efficient money supply achieved in the long run. In contrast, in the OG setting, the equilibrium allocation at least converges to the efficient allocation in the long run. This occurs because agents' beliefs constrain issuers, who will always issue as many notes as will be valued.
The welfare results also differ across the two environments studied when there is monopolistic issuance. In the search environment, the monopolist is not constrained by agents' beliefs because its members can commit to accept their own currency. However, it can limit its own issuance if it is not too large and can constrain the behavior of its members. Whether monopolistic issuance dominates competitive issuance in a search environment depends on the parameters of the model, in particular on agents' beliefs (how much money they will value) and on the cost of becoming a money issuer. For certain parameter values, the coalition's size allows it to not be constrained by agent's beliefs. In such cases, the best stationary allocation achievable with competitive issuance dominates the outcome with monopolistic issuance.
In the OG environment, in contrast, the monopolistic coalition is unable to limit its issuance of money, but it is constrained by agents' beliefs in the same way that competitive issuers are constrained. Because agents have short lives, their benefit from issuing money today always exceeds the benefit from moderating issuance. Their short lives also prevent them from committing to accept coalition money in future exchanges. Thus, as in the search environment, whether monopolistic or competitive issuance is more desirable is ambiguous in the OG environment. Which dominates depends on whether agents' beliefs impose a limit on the amount issued by each generation of agents in the monopoly coalition, or if it imposes a single limit on the coalition's issuance across all periods. In the former case, competitors achieve a better allocation. In the latter case, the monopolist achieves the efficient allocation, and competitors cannot do better.
The paper also finds that in both environments a licensing agency can always do better than pure laissez-faire if it can set the cost of becoming a money issuer. In fact, it can achieve the optimal quantity of money, at least in the long run. Of course, without the ability to vary the cost, there is no role for such an agency.
It is tempting to think of a government as being able to achieve the optimal quantity of money by selling rights to issue a certain quantity of money and retaining the right to print the money, presumably of just one type, itself. But that scheme begs the question, considered elsewhere for financial intermediaries, of who monitors the monitor (Krasa and Villamil, 1992) .
The whole concern of Hayek and others who advocate laissez-faire in money issuance is that any government has an incentive to overissue, and historically has done so. 
Appendix
denotes the value function of a money issuer who holds a unit of money when ( )
These value functions can be written as follows: It can easily be seen that 
0 . For these parameters the money issuers never agree to produce goods in exchange for money.
Since it has been established that the marginal utility of money is decreasing, it must be the case that if money issuers do not produce when L = 1, then they will not produce for The first term corresponds to the case where a coalition member meets another coalition member (probability μ) and a single coincidence of wants occurs (probability 1 k ). Coalition members practice gift giving with each other so their expected utility from such a meeting is . The second term corresponds to the case where a coalition member meets a noncoalition member (probability 1 u c − μ − ), who is not holding a note (probability 1 T M − ), and who produces the good the coalition member wants to consume (probability 1 k ). In that case, the coalition member consumes and starts the next period without a note. Finally, the last term corresponds to all meetings without a single coincidence of wants.
The expression for is
) coalition member meets a noncoalition member (probability 1 μ − ), who is not holding a note (probability 1 T M − ), and who produces the good the coalition member wants to consume (probability 1 k ). In this case, the coalition member may be allowed to issue a note. Since an amount ( ) 1 μ ε − of notes is going to be issued to noncoalition members, the probability that a coalition member will be able to issue a note is ( 
. 
